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In two experiments (total N=693) we explored whether people are willing to consider paintings made by AI-driven robots as 
art, and robots as artists. Across the two experiments, we manipulated three factors: (i) agent type (AI-driven robot v. human 
agent), (ii) behavior type (intentional creation of a painting v. accidental creation), and (iii) object type (abstract v. 
representational painting). We found that people judge robot paintings and human painting as art to roughly the same extent. 
However, people are much less willing to consider robots as artists than humans, which is partially explained by the fact that 
they are less disposed to attribute artistic intentions to robots.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays, encounters with works of art created by robots are no longer unusual: We come across paintings, 
poems, songs and even film scripts written by machines. These works are presented to us in the usual ways 
that artworks get presented in. Robots are even getting solo exhibitions [2] and having their works bought for 
hundreds of thousands of dollars [12]. And yet, when it comes to the question whether these robot-created 
objects are real works of art, opinions diverge. Art has traditionally been considered to be one of those domains 
exclusive to humans, as creativity – sometimes called “the final frontier” of AI research [14] – is highly valued 
by society, and is not that easily attributed to non-human entities, especially those which do not have mental 
states. There is a reasonable doubt whether robots can really create art. 
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If in our effort to answer this question we turn to the classic Turing test [67] the answer appears quite 
straightforward: We already know that artificial intelligence can produce art-like works that are not only 
indistinguishable from those produced by human agents, but that these works will also be perceived as having 
no less of an aesthetic value [23, 8]. However, many believe that robots cannot create art. Common reasons 
include that machines do not have human-like intelligence, autonomy, mental states, emotions or – partially as 
a consequence of the latter – the agency necessary to participate in social relations [32, 33].  
If, on the other hand, one deems (certain types of) robot-made creations art, a second interesting question 
arises: Are we willing to consider robots as artists? And if so, under what conditions? One might, following 
d’Inverno and McCormack [21] distinguish between “Heroic AI” and “Collaborative AI”. The former refers to 
independent creative autonomous agents, the latter to AI which is part of a group agent that includes humans. 
Naturally, there are also non-autonomous machines designed to be used as mere tools in the process of art 
creation. In the literature on robot ethics, there are proposals to attribute collective agency to human-robot 
collaborations [52] and this proposal could be extended to aesthetic agency as well. Others, however, attribute 
the authorship of the non-human created artworks solely to the human authors of the creative machines [64]. 
Just as in moral contexts, where we feel uncertain of who is responsible for robot behaviour [63, 10, 47], in 
aesthetics we might feel unsure who is responsible for artistic robot creation. 
The authorship problem is also reflected in the legal discussion on the ownership of the copyrights of the 
artworks produced by robots. Although works of art that are autonomously created by AI are currently not 
copyrighted, there are proposals to assign authorship to robots by redefining “authorship” to include non-human 
agents [16, 1, 60], while others propose to transfer the copyrights on the robot-created works to their human 
designers [9, 35]. 
1.1 Folk intuitions about art made by AI 
To what extent are people willing to call robots artists and their creations art? Although there is agreement 
among researchers that machines do not have consciousness [18, 34], people have a strong tendency to 
anthropomorphise robots and tend to ascribe a wide variety of mental states to them (for a review, see [55], as 
well as the references in section 1.2). While recently a lot of research has been conducted on intuitions regarding 
the perceived moral agency of robots, the same cannot be said about intuitions regarding the ability of robots 
to create art, and this area remains underexplored. Although some claim that “AI systems are not broadly 
accepted as authors by artistic or general public communities” [48], there is currently almost no empirical 
research on folk intuitions (one exception is [26]).  
Even if we discover that folk intuitions suggest that robots do create art and have all the mental states needed 
to be real creators, it won’t mean that those intuitions should be decisive in either philosophical or legal 
discussions. On the contrary, many authors see the tendency to anthropomorphise AI as problematic [59] and 
caution care about the ascription of rich psychological states to robots [62]. In the same vein, some authors 
claim that it would be “misleading and risky” not to raise awareness of this tendency to project human traits onto 
AI [61]. Naturally, to better understand the folk propensity to ascribe agentic traits to robots, more empirical 
research is needed and we should look beyond moral contexts only.  
How should empirical research on intuitions about robots’ ability to create art be conducted? If we examine 
the positions on the possibility of the robot-created art from the philosophical point of view, it is helpful to 
consider Mark Coeckelbergh’s [11] proposal to break the question “can machines create art?” down into three 
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smaller ones: what do we mean by creation, by art, and by machines? In trying to determine whether robots are 
perceived as being able to create art, we need to single out three aspects: the agent (autonomous robot, as 
compared to human), the process (the action by which a work is brought to life), and the product (the created 
object).  
1.2 Mental state ascription 
Many scholars define art in such a way, that artworks must be created by agents who have mental states. 
One of the most famous accounts is Jerrold Levinson’s intentional-historical definition of art, which states that: 
“X is an artwork at [time] t = df X is an object of which it is true at t that some person or persons, having 
the appropriate proprietary right over X, non-passingly intends (or intended) X for regard-as-a-work-
of-art, i. e., regard in any way (or ways) in which objects in the extension of ‘artwork’ prior to t are or 
were correctly (or standardly) regarded.” [41] 
Beardsley’s aesthetic definition of art also stresses the creator‘s intention, although it does not treat it as a 
necessary condition for an object to be considered a work of art. It states that a work of art is 
“[...] either an arrangement of conditions intended to be capable of affording an experience with marked 
aesthetic character or (incidentally) an arrangement belonging to a class or type of arrangements that 
is typically intended to have this capacity.” [6] 
There is also a romantic conception of the creation of art, according to which the latter is an expression of 
the creator‘s inner world and the creator‘s emotions [13]. All these conceptions of art are hard to reconcile with 
the position that robots can be creative – they (arguably) do not have intentions and there isn‘t much of an inner 
world to express. 
As we know from research in the psychology of art, inferences about creators’ mental states play an 
important role in our reasoning about artworks. Bloom (who draws inspiration from Levinson’s intentional-
historical definition of art) claims that people reason about artworks (and all artifacts) in terms of inferred 
authorial intent. They categorize an object as a member of the artifact kind if it is thought to be created with the 
intention for it to belong to that kind:  
“We infer that a novel entity has been successfully created with the intention to be a member of artifact 
kind X – and thus is a member of artifact kind X – if its appearance and potential use are best explained 
as resulting from the intention to create a member of artifact kind X.” [7] 
Inferences about the mental states of creators are as important in categorizing works of art as other artifacts. 
According to Bloom, authorial intent is relevant to determining the kind of an artifact even if it is not directly 
connected to the object’s appearance or function. Thus, intuitions on whether an object was created with an 
intention for it to belong to the category of artworks must play an important part in judgments whether an object 
should be categorized as art, which means that people’s tendency to ascribe intentions to robots would influence 
their judgments on whether the robot-created object should be admitted to the realm of artworks. 
Recent empirical work confirms Bloom’s proposal: When judging whether an object falls under the category 
of “artwork” the intent of the creator is seen as more important than even the appearance of the object in 
question [51]. Jucker et al. [37] found that perceived artists’ intentions affect what people categorize as art, as 
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well as evaluations of what is good art (see also [50, 56], and see [5] for Non-Western cultures)). Children, too, 
manifest the tendency to categorize objects as art and interpret them according to the perceived artists’ 
intentions [28, 29, 57]. 
Are people willing to ascribe intentionality to robots? The folk concept of intentionality consists of five 
elements: (i) a desire for an outcome, (ii) a belief about the action leading to that outcome, (iii) an intention to 
perform the action, (iv) awareness of fulfilling the intention while performing the action, and (v) the skill to perform 
the action [43]. Empirical research shows that all these elements are ascribed to robots, often (though not 
across the board) to similar degrees as to humans (see [55] for a review). People are, for instance, willing to 
attribute inculpating mental states in trolley dilemmas to AI-driven robots [68], foreknowledge of harm [65], or 
recklessness to robots in contexts of risk [39]. They are disposed to attribute intentions to robots [66], such as 
the intention to deceive and the capacity to lie ([38] see also [53] and [20]). When given a choice between 
mentalistic and mechanistic vocabulary to explain robot action, people are quite willing to use the former [46] 
and they invoke similar concepts to describe robot action as for human action [17]. Furthermore, fMRI studies 
have shown that perceived robot action gives rise to cortical activity related to mental state inferences [40, 54]. 
Given the folk disposition to attribute mental states to robots, it does not surprise that people, in contexts of 
harm, ascribe moral responsibility to them [25, 71], are willing to blame them (see e.g. [44, 45, 39] and want to 
punish them [42] – even if these machines have only “a body to kick, but still no soul to damn” [4]. Given the 
core importance of perceived mental states for the moral evaluation of robot actions and robot agents, we can 
expect them to play a similar role for the aesthetic evaluation for robot creations and creative agency.  
It should be noted that there are conceptions of art which do not require artworks to have been created by 
agents with mental capacities. For example, the institutional definition of art describes a work of art as something 
which is:  
“(1) an artifact (2) a set of the aspects of which has had conferred upon it the status of candidate for 
appreciation by some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution (the art-world)” 
[19] 
According to this view, institutional recognition would be enough for us to acknowledge a robot‘s creation as 
a work of art. The classical mimetic theory of art [3, 31] is another conception which does not necessarily invoke 
mental states on the part of the artwork‘s creator. If we consider art to be an imitation of the outer world, as 
opposed to an expression of the creator‘s inner world, robots might well be deemed creative. The empirical 
studies presented below will thus not only shed light on the question of whether the folk are willing to consider 
robot creations as art. They will also help elucidate the question of what the folk concept of art is more generally 
– and in particular, whether the creation of art is tied to an intention to do so.  
1.3 Can AI make art? 
In our empirical studies, we want to explore the question whether people are disposed to see paintings made 
by robots as art and whether they consider robots as artists. In line with Coeckelbergh’s [11] three core factors 
pertaining to this debate we manipulated (i) agent type (human v. AI-driven, autonomous robot), (ii) the process 
type (intentional v. accidental creation), and (iii) product type (abstract v. representational painting). In light of 
the foregoing discussion concerning the importance of perceived mental capacity, we tested the extent to which 
people were willing to ascribe a belief, a desire and an intention to the robot agent to make a painting. 
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Experiment 1 reports the data for a scenario in which the agent produced an abstract painting. Experiment 2 
reports the data for a scenario in which the agent produced a representational painting, i.e. a kind of work that 
might increase inferences concerning the agent’s intentionality.   
2 EXPERIMENT 1 - ABSTRACT ART 
2.1 Participants 
We recruited 392 participants online via Amazon Mechanical Turk. The IP address location was restricted to 
the USA. In line with the preregistered criteria,1 participants who failed an attention check or took less than eight 
seconds to answer the five main questions were excluded, leaving a sample of 254 participants (female: 53%; 
age M=44 years, SD=14 years, range: 23–79 years). 
2.2 Methods and Materials 
Participants were shown a vignette (see Appendix A1 for detail) in which either a human, or else an 
autonomous, AI-driven robot creates an abstract painting. Besides agent type, we manipulated how the painting 
came about: In one condition, the agent decides to make a painting (purposive), in the other condition they 
clean up the studio, and accidentally knock over paint that spills onto a canvas (accidental). In total there were 
thus four conditions (2 agent types x 2 behavior types), to which participants were assigned randomly.  
Having read the scenario, participants had to rate on a Likert scale anchored at 1 with "completely disagree" 
and 7 with "completely agree" to what extent they agreed with the following claims:  
(1) "The painting is art" (Art) 
(2) "The painting was made by an artist" (Artist) 
(3) "The agent wanted to make a painting" (Desire) 
(4) "The agent believed they were making a painting" (Belief) 
(5) "The agent intentionally made a painting" (Intention) 
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Main Results 
The results are graphically represented in Figure 1. A series of mixed-design ANOVAs determined that, 
aggregating across the two behavior type conditions, participants were more willing to confer the status of art 
to the human's painting than to the robot's (F(1,253)=7.598, p=.006, ηp2=.029), however, the effect size was 
small (equivalent to a Cohen’s d=.33). People were also more willing to consider the human an artist than the 
robot (F(1,253)=99.789, p<.001, ηp2=.283), and here the effect size was very large (equivalent to d=1.18). 
Aggregating across the two agent type conditions, participants were more inclined to judge the painting that 
resulted from purposive action to be art (F(1,253)=6.582, p=.011, ηp2=.026), and they were more willing to judge 
the purposively acting agent an artist (F(1,253)=18.895, p<.001, ηp2=.070). No significant interaction terms were 
observed for the core DVs art or artistic agency (both ps>.12). 
 
 
                                               




Figure 1: Mean ratings for art, artist, desire, belief, and intention across agent type (AI v. human agent) and behavior type 
(accidental v. intentional). Error bars denote 95%-confidence intervals.  
2.3.2 Explanatory DVs - Correlations 
The correlations between the core DVs – whether the painting was art and made by an artist – and the 
mental state DVs (desire, belief, intention) were all significant (all ps<.01, see Table 1). This suggests that the 
more pronounced the perceived desire, belief and intention to make a painting, the more pronounced the 
willingness to deem it art and its creator an artist. The correlation coefficients were considerably higher for the 
relations between mental states and artistic agency than for the relations between mental states and art 
judgments.  
Table 1: Bivariate correlations of DVs, two-tailed, **sig.<.01. 
r (Pearson) Art Artist Desire Belief Intention 
Art 
 
.59** .35** .35** .35** 
Artist .59** 
 
.53** .48** .42** 
Desire .35** .53** 
 
.93** .81** 
Belief .35** .48** .93** 
 
.86** 





Our experiment produced several findings: (i) Quite expectedly, people were more willing to deem an object 
art, and an agent an artist, if the latter acted intentionally rather than accidentally. This finding is in line with 
Levinson’s [41] intention-dependent definition of art. Note, however, that the role of intentionality is perhaps less 
pronounced than one might assume. Aggregating across agents, the effect size of behavior type was small for 
art (d=.30) and medium-small for artistic agency (d=.41). (ii) Although we found that people are more willing to 
confer art-like status to the human’s painting than to the robot, the effect size of the difference was small 
(Cohen’s d=.33, aggregated across behavior types). This suggests that people are quite willing to view robot 
art as art. By contrast, (iii) they are much less willing to consider robot agents artists than humans (here the 
effect size was very large, Cohen’s d=1.18). This is likely due to the fact that, for artistic agency, perceived 
mental states play a more important role than for the status of art (see Table 1), and mental state ascriptions 
were significantly lower for the robot than for the human agent (aggregating across behavior type, belief: d=.68, 
desire: d=.58, intention: d=.34).  
Given previous research concerning the folk’s willingness to ascribe mental states to robot agents in moral 
contexts [68,39,65] and beyond [66,17], we were somewhat surprised by the relatively low rates of their 
attribution in the robot conditions. In the purposive condition, mean ascription of belief, desire and intention to 
the human agent were all significantly above the midpoint of the scale (one sample t-tests, all ps<.001, see 
Appendix Table 3), whereas they were not significantly above the midpoint for the robot. This, we reasoned, 
might be due to the fact that the vignette involved an abstract painting, rather than a representational painting: 
Due to the painting’s abstract nature, people might infer that the robot lacked a genuine intention to make a 
painting (and perhaps just splashed around with paint). To explore this hypothesis, we ran a second experiment 
where the vignette specified that the painting looked like a “relatively realistic representation of the local 
landscape”. 
3 EXPERIMENT 2 - REPRESENTATIONAL ART 
3.1 Participants 
We recruited 301 participants online via Amazon Mechanical Turk. The IP address location was restricted to 
the USA. In line with the preregistered criteria,2 participants who failed an attention check or took less than eight 
seconds to answer the five main questions were excluded, leaving a sample of 257 participants (female: 46 %; 
age M=43 years, SD=13 years, range: 22–88 years). 
3.2 Methods and Materials 
The methods and materials were identical to Experiment 1 except for how the painting looked in the end. 
The painting that resulted was not described as "an abstract painting" but as looking like "a relatively realistic 
representation of the local landscape". There were again four conditions (2 agent types x 2 behavior types) to 
which participants were randomly assigned.  
                                               
2 https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=3kq5bn. Stimuli and data are available at https://osf.io/huxq2/. 
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3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Main Results 
The results are graphically represented in Figure 2. As in Experiment 1, a series of mixed-design ANOVAs 
determined that, aggregating across the two behavior type conditions, participants were more willing to consider 
the human an artist than the robot (F(1,103)=107.353, p<.001, ηp2=.298). Importantly, however, there was no 
significant difference in the willingness of the participants to confer the status of art to the human's painting than 
to the robot's (F(1,256)=.534, p=.466, ηp2=.002). Aggregating across the two agent type conditions, participants 
were more inclined to judge the painting that resulted from purposive action to be art (F(1,256)=13.081, p<.001, 
ηp2=.049), and they were more willing to judge the purposively acting agent an artist (F(1,256)=46.940, p<.001, 
ηp2=.156). No significant interaction terms were observed for the core DVs art or artistic agency (ps>.12). 
 
 
Figure 2: Mean ratings for art, artist, desire, belief, and intention across agent type (AI v. human agent) and behavior type 
(accidental v. intentional). Error bars denote 95%-confident intervals.  
3.3.2 Explanatory DVs – Correlations 
Replicating the findings from Experiment 1, the correlations between the core DVs – whether the painting 
was art and made by an artist – and the mental state DVs (desire, belief, intention) were all significant (all 
ps<.01, see Table 2). This again suggests that the more pronounced the perceived desire, belief and intention 
to make a painting, the more pronounced the willingness to deem it art and its creator an artist. The correlation 
coefficients were considerably higher for the relations between mental states and artistic agency than for the 
relations between mental states and art judgments. 
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Table 2: Bivariate correlations of DVs, two-tailed, **sig.<.01. 
r (Pearson) Art Artist Desire Belief Intention 
Art 
 
.49** .36** .36** .40** 
Artist .49** 
 
.55** .51** .49** 
Desire .36** .55** 
 
.90** .81** 
Belief .36** .51** .90** 
 
.90** 




Experiment 2 replicated several core findings of Experiment 1: (i) Consistent with Levinson’s account of art 
[41], people were more willing to deem an object art, and an agent an artist, if the latter acted purposefully rather 
than accidentally. In contrast to Experiment 1, the impact of intentionality was somewhat more pronounced. (ii) 
Once again, people were much less willing to consider robot agents artists than humans (aggregating across 
behavior types, the effect size was again very large, d=1.19). As in Experiment 1, perceived mental states 
correlate more strongly with artistic agency than with an object’s being considered art. 
Importantly, and in line with our hypothesis, the nature of the painting (abstract v. representational) did have 
an impact: Whereas people were less willing to view the robot painting as art than the human painting in 
Experiment 1, no significant difference could be found across agent types in Experiment 2.3 Differently put, 
people were just as willing to consider the robot’s painting as art as the human’s. As hypothesized, the 
ascriptions of mental states to the robot were higher in the representational painting conditions than in the 
abstract painting condition (see Appendix, Section A.3). However, the same held for the human agent. While 
the difference in perceived belief, desire and intention remained significant across agent types in Experiment 2, 
the effect sizes were somewhat smaller than in Experiment 1, which is presumably what explains why the 
paintings of human and robot were deemed art to the same extent. 
4 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In two experiments concerning an object’s status as art and its creator’s status as an artist, we manipulated 
three factors: (i) behaviour type (intentional v. accidental), (ii) agent type (AI-driven robot v. human) and (iii) 
object type (abstract v. representational painting). The first factor tells us something about the folk concepts of 
art and artistic agency broadly conceived (i.e., not limited to robot-art). Artistic agency seems to be quite strongly 
tied to an intention of making a work of art. Whether the work constitutes art is also significantly impacted by 
whether it was made intentionally. However, the results for Experiment 2 show at least moderate agreement 
with the claim that accidentally produced representational paintings can constitute art. This suggests that 
intentionality is a relevant criterion for an object’s status as art, though (and pace Levinson [41], quoted above) 
                                               
3 A three-way ANOVA with agent (human v. robot), behavior type (intentional v. accidental) and painting 
type (abstract v. representational) revealed significant main effects for all three IVs on art (all ps<.001) and 
for agent and behavior type on artistic agency (all ps<.001). All interactions were nonsignificant except for 
agent*behavior (p<.05), though the effect size was very small (np2=.009). For details, see Appendix, Table 4).   
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it also suggests that, on the folk view, intentions do not constitute a necessary condition for art. Given this 
finding, the folk concept of art thus allows for objects to be considered art which have been created by agents 
that might be incapable of having full-fledged artistic intentions. The manipulation of the second factor – agent 
type – confirms this. Although people were not particularly willing to ascribe mental states to the robot agent (at 
least in comparison to the results reported in [68, 66, 39, 65]), they were nonetheless rather willing to consider 
the robot paintings art (when not created by accident). Averaging across behavior types, we found no significant 
difference in the attribution of the status of art across agent types (robot v. human) for the representational 
painting (Experiment 2), and for the abstract painting (Experiment 1) the effect size was small. In other words, 
the folk are by and large as willing to consider robot creations as art as human creations (if all else is held fixed). 
Interestingly, however, this perceived similarity does not extend to creative agency: robots whose paintings are 
deemed art are not considered artists, whereas humans are – and here the effect-size of the difference was 
very large in both experiments. The third factor – abstract v. representational painting – had a significant main 
effect on the ascription of the status of art. It did not have a main effect on any of the other dependent variables, 
and all interactions with object type were nonsignificant for all five DVs.  
Our inquiry into the folk ascriptions of art and artistic agency to robots being the first of its kind, there is ample 
opportunity for future research. Potential factors of interest to manipulate include, for instance, (i) different types 
of artworks (music, poems, literature etc.), (ii) distinct types of qualities of the artwork that figure prominently in 
certain definitions of art such as, for instance beauty [6] or institutional recognition [19]. Furthermore, one could 
explore whether different features of the robot appearance (cf. e.g. [45]) or the specification of its computational 
abilities (cf. e.g. [39]) have an impact on the core dependent variables art and artistic agency. It might also be 
interesting to contrast robot agents not only with singular human agents, but group agents such as art 
collectives, or not yet fully formed human agents such as small children, or human-robot teams. Finally, this 
rather foundational inquiry into the folk concepts of art and artistic agency could be brought to bear on more 
pragmatic – yet by no means less interesting – questions, such as who gets the credit for, or holds the copyright 
of, art in the production of which AI was partially involved (see e.g. [24]).  
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A  APPENDICES 
A.1 Vignettes 
A.1.1 Experiment 1 
Condition 1 (human/intentional/abstract): Imagine a person in an art studio who decides to create a piece 
of art. She takes an empty canvas and starts splashing paint onto it. In the end, the object looks like an abstract 
painting. 
Condition 2 (human/accidental/abstract): Imagine a person in an art studio who is currently tidying up. 
She accidentally brushes against some jars of paint that spill onto an empty canvas. In the end the object looks 
like an abstract painting. 
Condition 3 (AI/intentional/abstract): Imagine a robot equipped with artificial intelligence that can make 
decisions autonomously. The robot is in an art studio and decides to create a piece of art. It takes an empty 
canvas and starts splashing paint onto it. In the end, the object looks like an abstract painting. 
Condition 4 (AI/accidental/abstract): Imagine a robot equipped with artificial intelligence that can make 
decisions autonomously. The robot is in an art studio and currently tidying up. It accidentally brushes against 
some jars of paint that spill onto an empty canvas. In the end the object looks like an abstract painting.  
A.1.2 Experiment 2 
Condition 1 (human/intentional/representational): Imagine a person in an art studio who decides to 
create a piece of art. She takes an empty canvas and starts splashing paint onto it. In the end, the object 
looks like a relatively realistic representation of the local landscape.  
Condition 2 (human/accidental/representational): Imagine a person in an art studio who is currently 
tidying up. She accidentally brushes against some jars of paint that spill onto an empty canvas. In the end, the 
object looks like a relatively realistic representation of the local landscape.  
Condition 3 (AI/intentional/representational): Imagine a robot equipped with artificial intelligence that can 
make decisions autonomously. The robot is in an art studio and decides to create a piece of art. It takes an 
empty canvas and starts splashing paint onto it. In the end, the object looks like a relatively realistic 
representation of the local landscape.  
Condition 4 (AI/accidental/representational): Imagine a robot equipped with artificial intelligence that can 
make decisions autonomously. The robot is in an art studio and currently tidying up. It accidentally brushes 
against some jars of paint that spill onto an empty canvas. In the end, the object looks like a relatively realistic 
representation of the local landscape.  
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A.2 One-sample t-tests 





type DV n t(n) p 
abstract AI accidental Art 62 -1.05 0.300 
abstract AI accidental Artist 62 -8.85 <0.001 
abstract AI accidental Desire 62 -20.41 <0.001 
abstract AI accidental Belief 62 -16.83 <0.001 
abstract AI accidental Intention 62 -14.89 <0.001 
abstract AI intentional Art 67 0.54 0.590 
abstract AI intentional Artist 67 -5.86 <0.001 
abstract AI intentional Desire 67 -2.93 0.010 
abstract AI intentional Belief 67 -1.83 0.070 
abstract AI intentional Intention 67 -0.11 0.920 
abstract Human accidental Art 66 0.79 0.430 
abstract Human accidental Artist 66 -0.06 0.950 
abstract Human accidental Desire 66 -10.58 <0.001 
abstract Human accidental Belief 66 -16.93 <0.001 
abstract Human accidental Intention 66 -15.87 <0.001 
abstract Human intentional Art 59 4.32 <0.001 
abstract Human intentional Artist 59 6.28 <0.001 
abstract Human intentional Desire 59 14.09 <0.001 
abstract Human intentional Belief 59 16.08 <0.001 
abstract Human intentional Intention 59 11.77 <0.001 
representational AI accidental Art 63 2.49 0.020 
representational AI accidental Artist 63 -9.45 <0.001 
representational AI accidental Desire 63 -14.53 <0.001 
representational AI accidental Belief 63 -15.61 <0.001 
representational AI accidental Intention 63 -13.65 <0.001 
representational AI intentional Art 61 5.46 <0.001 
representational AI intentional Artist 61 -3.18 <0.001 
representational AI intentional Desire 61 -0.18 0.860 
representational AI intentional Belief 61 1.11 0.270 
representational AI intentional Intention 61 2.3 0.030 
representational Human accidental Art 67 2.25 0.030 
representational Human accidental Artist 67 -0.06 0.950 






type DV n t(n) p 
representational Human accidental Belief 67 -13.81 <0.001 
representational Human accidental Intention 67 -16.74 <0.001 
representational Human intentional Art 66 9.32 <0.001 
representational Human intentional Artist 66 12.06 <0.001 
representational Human intentional Desire 66 10.33 <0.001 
representational Human intentional Belief 66 14.72 <0.001 
representational Human intentional Intention 66 12.3 <0.001 
 
A.3 Joint Analysis 
A.3.1 Participants 
Taken together, we recruited 693 participants online via Amazon Mechanical Turk. The IP address location 
was restricted to the USA. In line with the preregistered criteria,4 participants who failed an attention check or 
took less than eight seconds to answer the five main questions were excluded, leaving a sample of 511 
participants (female: 48 %; mean age: 43 years, SD = 14 years, range: 20–88 years). 
A.3.2 Methods and Materials 
The methods and materials are the ones described in Experiments 1 and 2. In the joint analysis, we used 
object type (abstract v. representational painting) as a third factor. So the joint analysis has a 2(agent type: 
human vs. AI) *2(behavior type: intentional vs. accidental) *2(object: abstract vs. representational) factor 
between-subjects design.  
A.3.3 Main Results 
A series of mixed-design ANOVAs determined that, aggregating across the two behavior type and the two 
agent type conditions, participants were more willing to confer the status of art to the representational painting 
than to the abstract painting (F(1,510)=17.910, p < .001, ηp2=.034, Tab. 4). No other significant main effects or 
interaction terms were observed for the object type (see Tab. 4). 
Table 4: Threeway-ANOVA. two-tailed **sig. <.001, *sig. <.05. 
𝜂p2 (N=511) Art Artist Intention Desire Belief 
Agent  .013* .291** .065** .161** .139** 
Behavior  .036** .111** .569** .480** .571** 
Object .034** .044 .006 .003 .006 
A*B .004 .009* .065** .089** .109** 
A*O .005 .000 .003 .007 .005 
B*O .000 .006 .001 .001 .001 
A*B*O .000 .000 .002 .005 .007 
adjusted R2 .074** .347** .588** .541** .612** 
 




Figure 3: Mean ratings for art, artist, desire, belief, and intention for the between-subjects design (object: abstract vs. 
representational). Error bars denote 95%-confident intervals. 
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